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ABSTRACT: What is it that explains the rationality of transitions in thought? It is 
natural to think that any such explanation will need to advert to at least two inter-
related issues. The first has to do with what is constitutive of the validity of a tran-
sition, and the second with our actual practice of making inferential transitions. 
Many accounts attempt to deal with both issues simultaneously by showing how 
it is that a thinker, competent with a logical expression N, grasps the content of N 
in such a way as to make their inferential practices with N rational. Advocates of 
the conceptualist approach to rationality, such as Christopher Peacocke, attempt 
to account for this relationship by grounding rationality in concept possession. 
This paper argues against this account, because (a) it cannot provide an appropri-
ate way of distinguishing true and false normative commitments; (b) typing a 
token cognitive state as a propositional attitude does not depend upon any specific 
set of conditions that thinkers must instantiate as a matter of metaphysical neces-
sity. In response, I briefly offer suggestions towards an alternative, and psycho-
logically tractable, account of rational commitment by resisting the tendency to 
run-together the two issues.
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1. Grasp of content
What is it that explains the rationality of transitions in thought? It is natu-
ral to think that any such explanation will need to advert to at least two 
inter-related issues. The first has to do with what is constitutive of the 
validity of a transition, and is closely connected to how logical contents 
are attached to logical expressions in the correct way. The second has to do 
with our actual practice of making inferential transitions, and is connected 
with how thinkers grasp logical contents.
 The kind of story that is often given is one in which both issues are 
dealt with by showing how it is that a thinker, competent with a logical 
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expression N, grasps the content of N in such a way as to make their infer-
ential practices with N rational. Such an account will, presumably, hope to 
say how token mental states can have the right sort of content, as a matter 
of metaphysical necessity:
(Relation): It is constitutive of a thinker T’s competence with a logical 
expression N for T to stand in relation R to N
(R is a cognitive state T is in when they grasp the content N).
Here is a first blush attempt:
(Relation1) Let R be knowing the logical rules for N; It is constitutive 
of a thinker T’s competence with a logical expression N for T to stand 
in relation R to N.
There are good reasons to think that this is too strong. It is common to 
assume a semantic theory according to which the content of a logical ex-
pression is as follows. Logical content is the contribution that a logical ex-
pression makes to the truth-conditions of propositions in which it occurs, 
where those truth-conditions are constraints on the way that the world 
must be if that proposition is true (or false). Take the (fairly simple) rules 
for conjunction:
(C): ((a  b) is true iff (a) is true, and (b) is true)
Here, the occurrence of  in a proposition expressed by the sentence “a 
and b” may be thought to contribute to the truth-conditions of (a  b) its 
Boolean function (as captured in the standard truth-table). So,  has the 
semantic function of conjunction because its content requires the sentence 
to conform to the logical properties of conjunction.
 Thus, (Relation1) does fairly well with respect to the first issue, but 
it is a further question, however, how a token mental state comes to have 
these specific logical properties as its content, and thus play a role in in-
tentional psychology, since, alone, they seem prima facie inadequate to 
type token mental states. The problem is one of determining how it is 
possible for mental transitions to come into contact with those, abstract 
contents. This is somewhat tricky because, for example, it does not seem 
possible even in relatively simple cases to determine every instance of the 
truth-preserving schema for “a  b |– b” in advance of being able to know 
whether or not it is valid. Consider that, in order to entertain a proposition 
involving conjunction (P), a thinker must first grasp the content of con-
junction. But, if grasping the content of conjunction consists in knowing 
every instance of (C), then thinkers must have propositional knowledge 
of the truth-conditions of (P) prior to entertaining (P). Put this way, fa-
mously, grasping  involves conjunction itself: for, how, otherwise, could 
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it be the case that, in order to grasp , a thinker must antecedently accept 
(C)?1
 There is also a difficulty in explaining how thinkers (e.g. children) 
can make inferences involving  without an ability to state principles such 
as (C), since they would be disqualified from grasping the relevant logical 
content. Any such account would appear to be too conceptually demand-
ing, since many people cannot state the relevant rules, whilst, (at least 
seeming to be) making logical inferences.2
 What is crucial is that explaining the rationality of a transition makes 
the right kind of contact between the abstract formulation of truth-condi-
tions and token mental states. One important response to these issues is 
Christopher Peacocke’s (1992b; 1999) account, which says that a think-
er’s grasp of the concepts involved in transitions involves assent to a set 
of dispositions or inferential abilities to make the correct inferences and 
judgments. This allows for a potential definition of (Relation) as follows:
(Relation2) Let R be a disposition to infer in accord with the valid 
inferences for N; It is constitutive of a thinker T’s competence with a 
logical expression N for T to stand in relation R to N.
In turning to concept possession, the suggestion is that assent to a set 
of dispositions or inferential abilities to make the correct inferences and 
judgments is involved in understanding the meanings of those concepts. 
In rough, the correct inferences for N form its “possession conditions”. 
These conditions both determine the content of N, and are required to be 
instantiated by a thinker possessing a concept N in order to type a specific 
cognitive state as a specific propositional attitude involving N, thus avoid-
ing the issues with (Relation1) raised above.
 This is the position I discuss in this paper, which I briefly outline in 
§2. In §3, I challenge the attempt to ground rationality in concept posses-
sion, because the conditions upon concept possession fail to be substan-
tive enough to guarantee normativity, before (§4) saying that the account 
is empirically intractable since typing a token cognitive state as a propo-
sitional attitude does not depend upon any specific set of conditions that 
thinkers must instantiate as a matter of metaphysical necessity. In §5 I 
say that the account cannot find support either in externalism, or in Pea-
cocke’s account of implicit conception. Finally, in §6, I discuss what op-
1 See Kalderon (2001): one “[…] cannot coherently claim that a speaker could come 
to entertain the content of existential quantification by knowing the standard explanation 
since the standard explanation presupposes the antecedent intelligibility of existential 
quantification.”
2 For discussion, see Boghossian (2001: 638), Harman (1986: 17–19).
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tions are available for an account of rational commitment, offering brief 
suggestions that refuse the tendency to run together the two issues (raised 
above), and draw upon recent work in cognitive psychology to offer some 
support.
2. From possession conditions to normativity
On Peacocke’s (1992b) account, for a thinker to possess a concept, they 
must find certain privileged inferences “primitively compelling”. An in-
ference is primitively compelling if a thinker finds it compelling, it is 
underived from other principles, and its correctness is not answerable to 
anything else for possession of a certain concept. Furthermore, this set of 
inferences constituting a concept’s possession conditions also individuate 
that concept so two concepts are distinct if their possession conditions 
differ.
 So, according to Peacocke, a concept such as “and” is individuated by 
certain possession conditions that a thinker must satisfy in order to possess 
that concept. In the case of “and”, a thinker must be primitively compelled 
to infer in accord with the natural deduction rules for conjunction:
(ConjunctionINTRO): a, b / a  b 
(ConjunctionELIM): a  b / a, b
Effectively, a thinker must be disposed to accept the validity of these spe-
cific rules in order to possess that concept, and so this can be put in terms 
of a fairly widely held supervenience thesis:
(Supervenience) Where two thinkers A and B have attitudes involv-
ing concepts Ca and Cb, and they have the same set of dispositions to 
make inferences and judgments involving Ca and Cb, then A and B 
possess the same concept C.
Rationality is built in to the account in two ways. First, in order for a 
thinker to make judgments involving a content, they are obliged to infer 
in certain ways, because concepts are individuated in terms of their role 
in judgment. Thus, the inferences mentioned in a concept’s possession 
conditions are not supposed to be merely descriptive; rather, they are ra-
tionally required of a thinker if they are to make any judgments involving 
that concept at all:
If rationality permits a thinker to withhold judgment on a content containing 
a given concept, in specified circumstances, while continuing to possess that 
concept, then it is possible for a thinker to withhold such judgment while 
possessing the concept. It follows that willingness to make such a judgment 
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cannot be part of the possession condition for the concept in question. (Pea-
cocke 1999: 19)
Second, Peacocke argues that the possession conditions for a concept also 
determine the semantic value for that concept so as to ensure that the in-
ferential transitions involving that concept (where possessed) will turn out 
to be truth-preserving:3
Outright acceptance of a transition would not be rational unless it were obvi-
ously truth-preserving. All the transitions outright acceptance of which are 
mentioned in the possession condition for a concept must be always truth-
preserving, that is, truth-preserving whatever instance is in question. (Pea-
cocke 2005: 171)
Hence, rationality is, in effect, written-in to the account from the outset.
3. Building-in false commitments
In order for Peacocke’s account to provide an extensionally adequate ac-
count of the determination of meaning, there must be some constraints on 
possession conditions because not every set of inferential rules is constitu-
tive of a genuine concept.
 This point is well known from Prior’s (1961) arguments regarding 
a (alleged) connective, tonk, which can be introduced with the following 
rules of inference:
TonkINTRO: a / a tonk b
TonkELIM: a tonk b / b
Tonk trivializes inferential practice since it allows a thinker to infer arbi-
trary propositions from any premise. Let us say, then, in keeping with the 
program of this paper, that the concept “tonk” builds in false normative 
commitments to its possession conditions. Hence, if we allow that the 
inference-form alone suffices to determine the concept, then something 
has gone wrong: the inferential rules effectively fail to determine a think-
able propositional content. It is, therefore, necessary to provide a way of 
discerning which rules of inference confer genuine meanings on a logical 
connective.
 There are a number of possibilities for restricting conceptual roles 
available in the literature, but they are, by and large, unsuccessful. For 
example, one suggestion due to Belnap (1962) is that the rules must give 
a conservative extension whereby a logical constant introduced into the 
3 This is Peacocke’s (1992b) “determination theory”.
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vocabulary should not allow for an inference not involving the new con-
stant to be deducible that was not deducible before the constant was added 
(Dummett 1973: 454). Tonk clearly fails on this account, but, given how-
ever that conservative extension is relative to the underlying logical sys-
tem, this does little to settle the problem of whether or not inference-rules 
express a genuine meaning. As Schecter and Enoch (2006) put it:
[…] considerations of conservativeness only apply to a concept given some 
inferential background; whether a rule is a conservative extension can only 
be evaluated with respect to some presupposed derivability relation.
There are also occasions where conservative extension fails, such as for 
second-order logic, which are nonetheless taken to be valid.
 Resultantly, according to Peacocke (2004), we should restrict the 
determination of genuine concepts in accord with truth-preservation:
Even if mere warranted assertibility were the aim of judgment, we would 
still need to say which sets of rules determine genuine meanings and which 
do not. Unless this theorist has some new resource for ruling out spurious 
meanings, he will need to rely on considerations having to do with reference, 
semantic value and truth; and then his conceptual role theory is no longer 
pure. (21)
In rough, this constraint may be put as follows:
(TP) A thinker correctly uses a sentence involving a logical term if, of 
the proposition expressed by that use, it is truth-preserving.
This expresses the idea the semantic values of logical terms are assigned 
so as to ensure that their conceptual roles are necessarily truth-preserving 
where those rules determine a genuine meaning. This constraint, as ap-
plied to tonk, shows that there is no binary function on truth-values that 
validates both its introduction and elimination rules, and, hence, there is 
no coherent semantic value for tonk. The introduction rule requires that 
“a tonk b” is true when a is true and b is false, but the elimination rule 
requires that when a is true and b is false, “a tonk b” is false. Hence, there 
are no coherent semantic assignments of truth-values for tonk since there 
is no truth-function that makes tonk-inferences truth-preserving. As Pea-
cocke (1992a: 802) puts it, there can be no determinate way the world has 
to be, if “a tonk b” is to come out true.4
4 For example, Peacocke (1987) argues that: “For each logical concept […] there 
are principles containing it such that it is partially constitutive of possessing that concept 
that the thinker has the primitive impression that those principles hold. Semantic values 
are assigned to the constants in such a way as to validate these principles. It follows that 
in these logical cases, the impression that such underived principles hold is sufficient for 
them to hold.” (178)
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 However, this puts pressure on the suggestion that the account really 
does support something like (Relation2), because of Peacocke’s (2004) in-
sistence that the account provides an explanation of thinkers’ justification 
in employing the inferential rules encoded by the possession conditions. 
Upholding (Relation2) requires that, for an inference that is part of the 
possession conditions for a concept (thus constitutive of the content of that 
concept), any thinker possessing the concept is justified in employing that 
inference.5 (TP) allows Peacocke to say that justification flows from the 
guarantee that conceptual roles are constrained so as to guarantee truth-
preservation. But, given that “tonk” shows that one cannot be justified in 
virtue of inferring according to any set of conceptual roles, the justifica-
tion for employing those rules would now appear to flow from their truth-
preservation, in which case it is this, rather than possession conditions, 
that is primarily accounting for rational commitment.6
 This latter point is problematic for (Relation2), since, in order to ac-
count for the rationality of inferential transitions involving logical terms, 
it seems that we would require, in addition to (Supervenience), knowledge 
of the validity of the relevant rules that are supposed to constitute the con-
tent of a concept.7 In which case, (Relation2) collapses into (Relation1).
 Let me embellish this point further. Conjunction may look like a 
rather silly example here, since almost nobody disputes the classical rules. 
However, consider the following, well known, issue. Let the inference-
form for “true” comprising its possession conditions be defined according 
to the T-schema:
TruthINTRO: If p, then <p> is true
TruthELIM: If <p> is true, then p
Accepting classical logic and semantic self-sufficiency (together with as-
sumption that propositions are structures of concepts), all of which Pea-
cocke does, entails that the naïve concept of truth similarly has built-in to 
it false normative commitments. These come to light in the context of the 
Liar paradox:
(L): This sentence is not true
5 This latter point is central in Peacocke’s “metasemantic” account of apriori justifi-
cation encapsulated in Peacocke’s (2004) “Rationalist Dependence Thesis”: “The rational 
truth-conduciveness of any given transition to which a thinker is entitled is to be philo-
sophically explained in terms of the nature of the intentional contents and states involved 
in the transition.” (52)
6 Horwich (2005: 5) makes a similar point.
7 That is, given that we reject reliabilism for justification. For an account of the famil-
iar reasons not to do so, see Bonjour (1985).
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If we say that (L) is true, then things will be as it says, in which case, (L) 
would be true, but, if (L) is true, then (L) is also not true. If it is not true, 
then, since it says of itself that it is not true, then it is true. So, if (L) is 
not true, then (L) is true. The concept “true”, defined according to the T-
schema, would commit the user to infer contradictions.8
 Now, consider what we should now say about “true”. Given (TP), 
since the inferential rules for “true” are not truth-preserving, by Peacocke’s 
account, there can be no semantic value that ensures those inferences de-
termine a genuine meaning. That is to say, if we restrict the determination 
of genuine concepts in the way that Peacocke suggests, then, since there 
is no semantic value that can make the possession conditions for “true” 
truth-preserving, we should say that “true” is not a genuine concept (and 
perhaps expect it to fall by the wayside with “tonk”).
 But, of course, in many circumstances, we have utterances that in-
volve the expression ‘true’, and thoughts that seem to involve “true”, all 
of which we normally attribute as having truth-values. In fact, that “true” 
as used in natural language expressions is meaningful seems to be pretty 
much a Moorean fact, and, is, at least, not something that Peacocke’s sys-
tem can do without. It seems, then, that, whilst the possession conditions 
for “true” may be inconsistent, this should not be taken as evidence to 
think that “true” does not, nonetheless, have determinate content. Why 
should we not say instead that the semantic value of true fails to satisfy 
the inference-form that we thought to be constitutive of its meaning, and 
so the semantic content of “true” is not determinately settled by its pos-
session conditions? As the literature surrounding the Liar makes clear, 
getting the correct account of “true” is not something that is separable 
from considerable cognitive and theoretical reflection.9 Ergo, possession 
conditions cannot (alone) ground rationality.
4. Competence failure
As further support for this latter suggestion, to wit; the semantic content 
of logical expressions is not determinately settled by what it takes for 
thinkers to possess that concept, and so normativity cannot be grounded in 
8 For similar presentations of this argument in the context of Tarski’s view on incon-
sistent languages, see Eklund (2002).
9 See, for example, the theory of truth presented by Kripke (1975). In fact, even 
if Peacocke were to suggest that a successor concept “true1” be introduced in place of 
“true”, this does not seem to do justice to the dialectic here, since we would still end up 
counting all previous uses of “true” as content-less, and, moreover, it rules out the view 
that the successor concept is about the same thing.
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the latter, consider that Peacocke’s account is not empirically tractable to 
suffice as a general constraint on thinking with a concept.
 The inferential rules to which thinkers are disposed in virtue of 
grasping content are supposedly guaranteed to be correct given that they 
are truth-preserving, and, in relation to belief-formation, these disposi-
tions are manifested in fixing propositional attitudes relevant to a think-
er’s judgments. But, it does not seem acceptable to say that in order to 
grasp a content, every inference of introduction or elimination needs to be 
manifested in judgments. If that were so, then thinkers grasping a content 
would not be capable of making errors of judgments, or basic inferential 
mistakes; if they did, they could not be ascribed a judgment with that con-
tent. This seems too inflexible a requirement to deal with the practice of 
actual thinkers.
 One way that the problem might be dealt with is by allowing for 
performance errors. It may be possible to introduce a fairly standard per-
formance / competence distinction, in which a thinker’s actual inferential 
practices do not tell against their competence, because of various perform-
ance errors; interference factors; memory limitations; distractions and so 
on.10 One might appeal, for example, to the idea that there occur cases in 
which thinkers make mistakes regarding inferences of introduction rules, 
for example, because those dispositions are masked.11 Though, for this 
to have traction, one has to be careful, since, it is required that whatever 
is constitutive of content ought to be manifested in a thinker’s actual dis-
positions in order to ascribe the correct content to that thinker. Now, say, 
for example, that it is allowed that a thinker can be ascribed an attitude 
with a specific content in terms of a particular competence that thinker 
possesses, but that this competence is not performed in the thinker’s judg-
ments. Then, it becomes tricky to see how a thinker can be attributed with 
that content rather than some other content that does seem to be performed 
in their judgments.12
 Consider, for example, the conjunction fallacy (Kahneman & Tversky 
1982). In such cases, participants routinely and systematically fail to infer 
in accordance with the conjunction elimination rule; and rather, suggest 
that the probability of (A&B) is greater than (A), (i.e. P(A&B) ≥ P(A)). 
Whilst many philosophers have discussed the relevance of heuristics and 
biases literature to performance ability, the relevance to competency is 
10 See Chomsky (1965: 3–4).
11 The general idea might be that the disposition is present, but certain factors prevent 
its manifestation. For a discussion of masked dispositions, see Lewis (1997).
12 In essence, this objection to dispositionalism is in Kripke (1982: 30).
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not often recognized, for; if the fallacy corresponded to performance error 
alone, there should be random failures with little correlation, but those 
failures are systematic and consistent:
If each departure from normative responding represents a momentary pro-
cessing lapse due to distraction, carelessness, or temporary confusion, then 
there is no reason to expect covariance among biases across tasks (or cova-
riance among items within tasks, for that matter) because error variances 
should be uncorrelated. (West & Stanovich 2000: 646)
It seems, there, that thinkers routinely entertain thoughts even with simple 
logical contents such as conjunction, whilst nonetheless failing to instanti-
ate the relevant inferential rules. In that case, thinkers may be attributed 
attitudes involving certain contents whilst not also instantiating the nec-
essary conditions to ensure that their inferential practice can be determi-
nately truth-preserving.
 Recall that, for Peacocke, attributions of genuine content can only 
be deemed correct given that a thinker is disposed to infer such that those 
inferential transitions are truth-preserving. But, conceiving of such infer-
ential transitions as required to have thoughts involving a content (and, 
so also attribution of content to a thinker) would effectively entail routine 
content-failure.13 This seems both implausible and unwarranted, partic-
ularly given the significant literature regarding the flexibility regarding 
mental states that is nonetheless consistent with thinkers having the capac-
ity for attitudes with the relevant content.14 It may well be that something 
other than inferential competency is involved in thinkers grasping content. 
For example, relevant data from cognitive psychology suggests that that 
the inferential patterns associated with a logical expression often oper-
ate through “quick and dirty” heuristics and associations, where thinkers 
may rely upon a variety of psychological phenomena such as preferences, 
emotions, desires and so on.15 Routine failures to infer according to a set 
of natural deduction rules does not provide good evidence for content-
failure, in which case, as we saw above, the semantic content of logical 
expressions is not settled by the inferential rules thinkers are disposed to 
make.
13 Similar problems occur for Peacocke’s (2004) qualifications that it may be a funda-
mental “rule of reference” that determines content, since, there the constraints on grasping 
content are even more substantive than those discussed here.
14 For an overview, see Medin et. al. (2005).
15 See Sloman (1996).
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5. Appealing to external factors
Perhaps Peacocke might attempt to circumvent these issues by appealing 
to externalism. The idea being: as Putnam (1975) grasps the content of 
“elm” whilst having the ability to discriminate between elms and beeches, 
thinkers can have a partial or incomplete grasp of the content of logical 
expressions. Those thinkers may not be able to understand always which 
inferences are valid; they would commit fallacies, and so on, but they 
would still be attributed attitudes to propositions containing the relevant 
concepts.16
 Even if this story can be made to work, I do not think that it will help 
Peacocke. One reason for this has been forcefully advanced by William-
son (2003; 2007). I do not wish to belabour the point here as it has been 
much discussed in the relevant literature, but, in outline it is as follows. 
Williamson points to Vann McGee’s (1985) supposed counterexample to 
modus ponens, with the suggestion that modus ponens is not, therefore, a 
valid rule of inference. Williamson goes on to say that (supposing McGee 
is incorrect), it would still not be the case that we should say that McGee 
does not grasp the content of modus ponens. Generalising further, the sug-
gestion is this; given that there are philosophical experts that deny that 
basic inference forms are valid, it cannot be the case that for an inference 
form to be content-determining, any expert-speaker, competent with the 
relevant expressions, must be disposed to accept it. Hence, externalism 
will not help as it entails that (Supervenience) is false.
 Peacocke (1998) has suggested that a more moderate version of (Su-
pervenience) may be required for certain conceptual contents, involving 
implicit conceptions rather than simple possession conditions.17 In brief, 
an implicit conception is taken to be a possession condition for a concept 
that influences and explains our judgments, but is less stringent than pos-
session conditions (as understood in Peacocke 1992b). So, for example, 
we might not be primitively compelled to accept the possession condi-
tions for “or”, as defined by the natural deduction rules for disjunction. 
Again, for implicit conceptions to do any serious explanatory work, they 
must be guaranteed to be truth-preserving given that they are involved 
in determining the content of the relevant concepts. The problem here 
16 This is somewhat problematic as outlined here given that externalism in Putnam’s 
example requires causal-historical links to elms, and, we may presume that there are no 
such links to logical properties. So, perhaps the kind of externalism required is the social 
externalism of Burge (1986).
17 It is worth pointing out that implicit conceptions are not supposed to be necessary 
for basic logical terms such as conjunction.
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is therefore quite clear. Peacocke (1998) must end up simply stipulating 
as an additional premise that the implicit conception of “or” is: (a or b is 
true iff either a is true or b is true) (46), in order to guarantee that “or” has 
the content of classical disjunction. Thus, we end up with the problems 
regarding justification discussed in §3. Moreover, appealing to implicit 
conceptions entails a substantive weakening of the account, since posses-
sion conditions will no longer play the relevant role in content ascription, 
nor provide traction on the justification of the conceptual role that is sup-
posed to determine the content of a concept.
6. Content and normativity
Let me sum up the preceding. On Peacocke’s theory, there is a type-type 
relationship between grasp of logical content and a particular symbol-
tokening inferential disposition. However, as I have shown, attitudes to 
propositions involving the content of a logical expression can be realized 
by varied symbol-tokening inferential abilities. But, if it is possible for at-
titudes to propositions involving a concept to be realized by very different 
symbol-tokening dispositions, then it cannot be a type-type relationship 
that makes thinkers with varying inferential abilities all realize the state of 
having an attitude with that concept. So, for example, the semantic content 
of “true” comes apart from what is required for possession of the concept, 
and normativity cannot be built into concept possession in so far as this 
would involve thinkers having false normative commitments.
 There are a number of options that we might consider in response. 
One alternative would be to suggest, as Williamson (2007: 4), that any ac-
count that makes certain “acceptance conditions” a necessary condition for 
content ascription will fail, arguing that there are no inferential constraints 
on concept possession. He concludes that we should reject the traditional 
connection between content and rationality. But, this conclusion seems 
unnecessarily strong, and I agree with Wikforss (2010), that severing the 
link altogether makes it increasingly problematic to provide a satisfactory 
account of semantic competence. In answer to Williamson’s criticisms, 
we might also argue that, just because the connections are not transpar-
ent does not suffice to show that they do not exist, particularly given that 
rationality itself appears to involve (perhaps constitutively) consciously 
understanding the content of the involved terms, as Bill Brewer (1995) 
observes:
Epistemologically productive reasoning is not a merely mechanical manipu-
lation of belief, but a compulsion in thought by reason, and as such involves 
some conscious understanding of why one is right in one’s conclusions. 
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What drives one in genuine cases is precisely what one lacks if one has 
simply been drilled by the dictators of the International Academy of Logic 
[…] to reason in ways for which one sees no evident rationale, no point or 
purpose. (242–3)
Given this, I think it is profitable to pursue an alternative position, which 
allows that we can hold mistaken views regarding the meanings of our 
terms, since, effectively (Supervenience) is false, given the reasoning in 
§4 and §5. Nonetheless, Peacocke’s constraint on the determination of 
meaning (TP) may be retained so long as explaining thinkers’ grasp of 
logical content is distinguished from explaining thinkers’ knowledge of 
the propositions expressed. This, would, in effect, separate out the two 
issues defined at the outset of the paper.
 On this view, we might adopt a more liberal, Davidsonian (2001: 
221–3), approach to concept possession requiring a norm of rationality 
such that for a thinker to have attitudes, those attitudes must be, on the 
whole, rational, suitably cohere with one another, and so on. But, this 
may be combined with the idea that logic is concerned with necessary 
truth-preservation across argument, which is dependent upon the content 
of the propositions involved. As pointed out above, in order that a thinker 
correctly uses a sentence involving a logical term, that thinker must also 
be justified in believing, of the proposition expressed by that use, that it 
is truth-preserving. Peacocke’s theory of meaning is supposed to provide 
this sort of justification for (TP), but it fails, since, as in the case of “true”, 
this may require far further reflective, and even theoretical, activity.
 There is some support for this kind of account from cognitive psy-
chology. As discussed in §4, ordinary concept possession involves a variety 
of abilities and associations; involving dispositions, desires, preferences, 
emotions relying on perceptual similarity, stereotypes, and temporal regu-
larity (Medin et. al. 2005). So, having propositional attitudes requires no 
specific underlying psychological behavior to be implemented in the form 
of inferential dispositions and practices.
 However, our capacity for rational inference is not delimited by or-
dinary heuristic inferential abilities. It is possible for thinkers to come to 
have an improved understanding of concepts in tandem with a greater abil-
ity to exercise the inferences and judgments corresponding certain norms 
of inference.18 For example, Kahneman and Tversky (1982) showed that 
many participants, having committed the conjunction fallacy, were willing 
to defer to the classical rules, admit to making a mistake and revise their 
18 In the literature, these are usually assumed to coincide with classical logical infer-
ences, but there appears little support for this assumption given the burgeoning literature 
on non-classical logic; see Priest (2001) for a survey.
18 Prolegomena 12 (1) 2013
judgments accordingly. In addition, Agnoli and Krantz (1989) also found 
that (prior) brief training in the logic of sets (using Euler circles) markedly 
improved the performance of participants.
 One explanation for this, for which there is much evidence for, is 
the “dual-process” theory of reasoning (Sloman 1996; West & Stanovich 
2000). Such theories suggest that there are two systems of human reason-
ing: System-1 processes, which are automatic, associative, and heuristic 
based; and, System-2 processes, which are controlled, deliberate, serialized 
and general. Typically, Type-2 processes are taken to be responsive to ra-
tional norms such that they decontextualise the rules involved in inference 
and judgment. The heuristic associations primed in the Linda problem, 
for example, result from System-1 processes, which can be overridden by 
higher-level cognitive functions generated by Type-2 reasoning.19
 On this story, we have a basic, empirically tractable account of con-
cept possession, that suggests that thinkers routinely display a tendency to 
attempt to systematise heuristic inferential practices towards improving 
their performance, in line with a tendency to reason according to certain 
evaluative norms. It is the project of epistemological and logical theories 
to determine what these evaluative norms are, such that they conform to 
the norms of rationality. But, whatever the epistemic norms are, they do 
not appear at the level of basic dispositions.20
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